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Utilising Item Response Theory in Computing Corporate 
Governance Indices 
Navajyoti Samanta* 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars1 have been at this for quite some time: how does one properly characterise the 
amalgamation of management, accounting, law, finance, economics, sociology, business ethics, 
and organisational behaviour? Although new in relative terms, corporate governance seems to 
provide an appropriate umbrella term, which combines all these interdisciplinary elements.2  
With this in mind, and by no means exhaustive, corporate governance has been described in a few 
ways that merit restatement. Firstly, the Cadbury Report WHUPV LW DV µthe system by which 
FRPSDQLHVDUHGLUHFWHGDQGFRQWUROOHG¶3 'DLO\VHHVLWDVWKHµGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKHEURDGXVHVWR
which organisational resources will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the myriad 
SDUWLFLSDQWV LQ RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶4 Likewise 6KOLHIHU DQG 9LVKQ\ YLHZ LW DV WKH ZD\ µLQ ZKLFK
VXSSOLHUVRIILQDQFHWRFRUSRUDWLRQVDVVXUHWKHPVHOYHVRIJHWWLQJDUHWXUQRQWKHLULQYHVWPHQW¶5 
2(&'LQWHUHVWLQJO\VW\OHLWDVDµVHWRIUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQDFRPSDQ\¶VPDQDJHPHQWLWVERDUG
its shaUHKROGHUVDQGRWKHUVWDNHKROGHUV«WKDWSURYLGHVWKHVWUXFWXUHWKURXJKZKLFKWKHREMHFWLYHV
of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectiYHVDQGPRQLWRULQJSHUIRUPDQFH¶6  
 
                                                          
*
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/DZ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1
 See generally A Smith, An Inquiry into the nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776); and A Berle and G 
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Equity (1932).  
2
 DR Fischel, ³The Corporate Governance Movement´ (1982) 35 Vanderbilt Law Review 1259.   
3
 Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(1992) para 2.5.  
4
  CM Daily, DR Dalton, and AA Cannella, ³Introduction to Special Topics Forum ± Corporate Governance: Decades 
of Dialogue and Data´ (2003) 28 Academy of Management Review 371.  
5
 A Shleifer and R W Vishny, ³A Survey of Corporate Governance´ (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 737.  
6
 OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance (2004).  
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For this reason, it is fair to say (especially with the wide range of definitions attached to 
corporate governance) that the aims and the tools of corporate governance implementation also 
vary widely, and are especially dependent on the legal, cultural and structural implications of the 
corporate form in any given context.7 And due to the broad effects of corporate governance, there 
have been numerous empirical and comparative studies8 conducted, which, taken together, have 
sought to find correlative relationships between a range of factors: financial performance;9 firm 
value;10 access to finance;11 executive remuneration;12 accounting standards;13 mergers and 
acquisitions;14 behaviour compliance;15 and shareholder activism.16 This has been done through 
both a micro and macro-economic lens.  
Notwithstanding, the earlier data were collected from a single country, or terribly similar 
groups of countries. To expound on this, until the mid-1990s little effort was made to publish 
quantitative research in comparative corporate governance. A seminal reason for this trend is 
centred on the fact that the comparative study of corporate governance was limited to four key 
                                                          
7
 OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance (2004). 
8
 6HHJHQHUDOO\8%KDWWDFKDU\DDQG+'DRXN³7KH:RUOG3ULFHRI,QVLGHU7UDGLQJ´-RXUQDORI)LQDQFH5; 
S Claessens, S Djankov and LH3/DQJ³7KHVHSDUDWLRQRIRZQHUVKLSDQGFRQWUROLQ(DVW$VLDQ&RUSRUDWLRQV´
 -RXUQDO RI )LQDQFLDO (FRQRPLFV  $ '\FN DQG = /XLJL ³3ULYDWH %HQHILWV RI &RQWURO $Q ,QWHUQDWLRQDl 
Comparison´ (2004) 59 Journal of Finance 537; M Faccio and LHP Lang, ³The Ultimate Ownership of Western 
European Corporations´ (2002) 65 Journal of Financial Economics 365; M Pagano and P Volpin, ³The Political 
Economy of Corporate Governance´ (2005) 95 American Economic Review 1005; M Siems, ³Shareholder Protection 
Around the World´ (2008) 33 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 111.  
9
 T Aksoy and S Bozkus, ³The Impact of Corporate Governance on accounting measures of financial performance, 
credit usage and trade and openness: an empirical study on Turkish SMEs´ (2007), available at 
www.cass.city.ac.uk/data/assets/pdf/file/0006/37338/T-Aksoy.pdf.   
10
 KV Lins, ³Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets´ (2003) 38 Journal of Finance and Quantitative 
Analysis 159; A Parthasarathy, K Menon and D Bhattacherjee, ³Executive Compensation, Firm Performance and 
Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis´ (2006), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=881730; R Morck, 
³Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis´ (1998) 20 Journal of Financial Economics 
293.  
11
 R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A Shleifer and RW Vishny, ³Law and Finance´ (1998) 106 Journal of Political 
Economy 1113; R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A Shleifer and RW Vishny, ³Legal Determinants of External 
Finance´ (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 1131.  
12
 ID Gregory-Smith, ³Empirical Studies in UK Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration´ (2008), 
available at www.etheses.nottingham.ac.uk/666/1/ianthesis.pdf.  
13
 K Shankaraiah and DN Rao, ³Corporate Governance and accounting standards in Oman: An empirical study on 
practices´ (2004), available at www.akamaiunuiversity.us/forms/ShankaraiahRao_051.pdf.  
14
 S Rossi and P Volpin, ³Cross-country determinants of mergers and acquisitions´ (2003), available at 
www.ssrn.com/abstract=395020; A Bris and C Cabolis, ³Adopting better corporate governance: evidence from cross-
border mergers´ (2008) 14 Journal of Corporate Finance 224.  
15
 G Laan, ³Behavioural Corporate Governance: Four Empirical Studies´ (2009), available at 
www.dissertations.ub.rug.nl/FILES/faculties/feb/2009/g.van.der.laan/00titlecon.pdf.    
16
 E Bengtsson, ³Organisational approaches to corporate governance: an empirical study on shareholder activism´ 
(2007) 3 International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 238.  
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countries: the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Japan.17 And given the narrow 
approach to the study of these jurisdictions, the studies focused on the qualitative rather than 
quantitative method. There is another attribution factor for the low academic output in quantitative 
corporate governance research: the unavailability of an acceptable uniform standard to judge the 
law and policy adopted by different legal systems. This was remedied, partially, by the 1992 
Cadbury Report18, which acted as a catalyst for a wave of academic treatments associated with the 
investigation into the health of shareholder and investor rights19 across nation-state boundaries. 
The standstill on quantitative comparative corporate governance research was finally broken by 
WKHSXEOLFDWLRQRIµ/DZDQG)LQDQFH¶20 in 1998. Since then, there has been an oversaturation of 
academic research that focuses on quantifying comparative corporate governance traits, and 
studying its impact on various indicators.21 
Consequently, this paper will discuss how to improve data aggregation for the purpose of 
creating a scientifically robust, unambiguous methodology in the pursuit of quantifying multi-
country indices utilising item response theory (IRT). Moreover, the paper addresses how it is 
advantageous to operate IRT, rather than classical test theory (CTT), which is commonly used by 
a sizable group of researchers. More specifically, the paper highlights the differences between the 
uses of both methods on the same datasets, ultimately comparing the results.  
 
B. DATA SET I22 
 
                                                          
17
 6HHJHQHUDOO\%*URVVIHOGDQG:(ENH³&RQWUROOLQJ WKHPRGHUQFRUSRUDWLRQ a comparative view of corporate 
SRZHULQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG(XURSH´American Journal of Comparative Law -&KDUNKDP³7KH
$PHULFDQ&RUSRUDWLRQDQGWKH,QVWLWXWLRQDO,QYHVWRU$UH7KHUH/HVVRQVIURP$EURDG´Columbia Business 
Law Review 765.  
18
 Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (n 3).  
19
 See generally L Bebchuk, ³Efficient and inefficient sales of corporate FRQWURO´ (1994) Journal of Quarterly 
Economics 957; L Bebchuk and L Zingales, ³Corporate Ownership Structures: Private v Social Optimality´ (1995) 
National Bureau of Economic Research, available at www.nber.org/papers/w5584.pdf and D Gromb, ³Is One-share-
One-Vote Optimal?´ (1993) Financial Markets Groups, LSE, available at 
www.insead.edu/faculty/research/personal/dgromb/research/documents/1s1v.PDF.   
20
 La Porta HWDO³/DZDQG)LQDQFH´ (n 11). 
21
 R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A Sheifler ³Economic Consequences of Legal Origins´ (2008) 46 Journal of 
Economic Literature 285.  
22
 Original data set, available at www.faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/images/uploads/faculty/rafael-
laporta/LegalDeterm-Share-Credits.xls. This was mirrored, with minor adjustments, available at 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0Bwa6if0xMceTWhwX3c2bEMwT1E&authuser=0.   
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The 1998 paper worked on the hypothesis that countries with poorer investor protection 
have smaller, and, more importantly, thinner capital markets. The authors coded for forty-nine 
countries, using eleven factors to describe the corporate governance of each country. The variables 
were: 
 
x One share-One vote23 
x Anti-director rights index24 
o Proxy by mail25 
o Shares not blocked before meeting26 
o Cumulative voting or proportional representation27  
o Oppressed minorities mechanisms28 
o Pre-emptive right to buy new issues of stock29  
o Percentage of share capital to call for extra-ordinary general meeting30 
x Creditor rights index containing four  
o Restrictions on filing a reorganisation petition31 
                                                          
23
 Var: c1sh_1vo - Equals 1 if the company law or commercial code of the country requires that ordinary shares carry 
one vote per share, and 0 otherwise. Equivalently, this variable equals 1 when the law prohibits the existence of both 
multiple-voting and non-voting ordinary shares and does not allow firms to set a maximum number of votes per 
shareholder irrespective of the number of shares owned, and 0 otherwise. 
24
 La Porta HWDO³/DZDQG)LQDQFH´ (n 11) at 1134-38: describes ADRI in Table I as a cumulative of 5 variables 
based on the 1996 working paper; but in the calculation in Table II the ADRI consists of 5 variables, and theoretically 
the value can range between 0 and 6. The pre-emptive right to buy new shares is used in ADRI calculations in Table 
II, but not stated in Table I. 
25
 Var: mail_prx - Equals 1 if the company law or commercial code allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote, and 
0 otherwise. 
26
 Var: nshsbloc - Equals 1 if the company law or commercial code allows firms to require that shareholders deposit 
their shares prior to a general shareholders meeting, thus preventing them from selling those shares for a number of 
days, and 0 otherwise. 
27
 Var: cumu_vot - Equals 1 if the company law or commercial code allows shareholders to cast all of their votes for 
one candidate standing for election to the board of directors, and 0 otherwise. 
28
 Var: oppr_mi2 - Equals 1 if the company law or commercial code grants minority shareholders either a judicial 
venue to challenge the management decisions, or the right to step out of the company by requiring the company to 
purchase their shares when they object to certain fundamental changes, such as mergers, asset dispositions and changes 
in the articles of incorporation, and equals 0 otherwise. 
29
 Var: prempt - coded as 1 when the pre-emptive right to buy new issues of stock which can only be waived by a 
shareholder vote, and 0 otherwise. 
30
 Var: Esmvotes - It is the minimum percentage of ownership of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting. Coded 1 when the minimum percentage of shareholder vote is ten per cent or less. 
31
 Var: ch11_res - Equals 1 if the reorganisation procedure imposes restrictiRQVVXFKDVFUHGLWRUV¶FRQVHQWRUPLQLPXP
dividend to file for reorganisation, and 0 otherwise.  
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o Secured creditors gain possession of security once the reorganisation petition has 
been approved, with no automatic stay on secured assets32  
o Secured creditors first in distribution of proceeds from reorganisation33  
o Debtor management does not stay in control34  
Thus the relevant corporate government data was in an N x M matrix of 49 x 11 data 
points.35 A typical line of data is presented below:  
 
Cou
ntry  
c1sh_
1vo 
oppr_
mi2 
esmv
otes 
mail_
prx 
cumu
_vot 
pre
mpt 
nshsb
loc 
secu
_1st 
ch11
_res 
mgt_
nost 
nauto
_st 
Chil
e 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Anti-director rights index = 5 Creditor rights index = 2 
  
(1) Classical Theory Test  
For over a century, CTT has been the mainstay of social science measurement. CTT grew out of 
the work of Charles Spearman, in which he showed how to exact the correlation coefficient and 
obtain an index of reliability.36 The basic postulate of CTT is usually expressed as X = T + E, 
which translates to (X) being the sum of true score/component (T) plus a random error (E). CTT 
theory led to factor analysis and related developments.37 In its simplest form, researchers assume 
that (E) is inconsequential, and that all observed variables have equal weight on (X). La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny used this simple variation of CTT and calculated the anti-
                                                          
32
 Var: nauto_st - Equals 1 if the reorganisation procedures impose an automatic stay on the assets of the firm upon 
filing the organisation petition. This restriction prevents secured creditors from gaining possession of their security, 
and 0 otherwise.  
33
 Var: secu_1st Equals 1 if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the 
disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. Equals 0 if non-secured creditors, such as the Government and workers, 
are given absolute priority. 
34
 Var: mgt_nost - Equals 1 if the debtor keeps the administration of its property, pending the resolution of the 
reorganisation process, and 0 otherwise. Also, this variable equals 0 when an official appointed by the court or by 
creditors is responsible for the operation of the business during reorganisation. 
35
 Edited dataset, available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwXa6if0xMceMn16V1ROY3RJdzg/view.  
36
 C Spearman, ³The proof and measurement of association between two things´ (1904) 15 The American Journal of 
Psychology 72.  
37
 RE Traub, ³Classical test theory in historical perspective´ (1997) 8 Educational Measurement: Issue and Practices; 
K Bollen and R Lennox, ³Conventional Wisdom on measurement: a structural equation perspective´ (1991) 110 
Psychological Bulletin 305.  
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director rights index and the creditor rights index, by merely adding all the variables represented 
under them. To illustrate, using the above data line as a point of reference, ADRI for Chile is five 
and the creditor rights index is two. Hence, an overall corporate governance index would comprise 
RIHTXDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQIURPDOOHOHYHQYDULDEOHVDQG&KLOH¶VFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQPHQWLQGH[ZRXOG
be eight as a result.38  
(2) Item Response Theory  
IRT houses several mathematical models that describe, in terms of probability, the association 
between observed variables and the inborn latent trait being measured. Louis Thurstone developed 
the conceptual basis for IRT in the 1920s.39 His findings focused on the connection between the 
success in test items and the distribution of successive age or grade groups.40 So, under IRT it is 
assumed that all observed factor values are expressions of the underlying latent trait of the object 
being tested. Resultantly, from a frequentist ± or classical ± perspective, IRT is a probabilistic 
factor analysis, which uses Bayesian analysis to estimate factor loading. In the context of the LLSV 
data assessment, again using the previous example, an IRT researcher would assume that the latent 
WUDLWIRU&KLOHLVșChile. Due to this, observed items, like c1sh_1vo, oppr_mi2, esmvotes, mail_prx, 
cumu_vot, and prempt, assume the response pattern of YChile = {1,1,1,0,1,1}. A two-parameter IRT 
model for one observed variable mathematically manifests as expressed below: 
 ܲ൫ܿ ?ݏ݄ ? ?ݒ݋ ൌ  ?ȁߠǡߙܿ ?ݏ݄ ? ?ݒ݋ ǡ ߚ௖ଵ௦௛ ?ଵ௩௢൯ ൌ  ଵଵା௘షഀ೎భೞ೓ ?భೡ೚൫ഇషഁ೎భೞ೓ ?భೡ೚൯ 41 
 
Where probability of the value of c1sh_1vo is to be 1, and dependent on three parameters, 
ZKLFK LV WKH ODWHQW WUDLW EHLQJ PHDVXUHG Įc1sh_1vo is the discrimination parameters of variables 
c1sh_1vo DQGȕc1sh_1vo; these also act as the difficulty parameter of c1sh_1vo. Put differently, if the 
XQGHUO\LQJFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHWUDLWRI&KLOHLVșChile, then the probability of c1sh_1vo having a 
value of 1 or 0 dHSHQGVRQ WKHXQNQRZQGLVFULPLQDWLRQSDUDPHWHUĮc1sh_1vo, and the unknown 
                                                          
38
 La Porta HWDO³/DZDQG)LQDQFH´ (n 11) did not calculate an overarching corporate governance index; they used 
ADRI, creditor rights index and one share-one vote, to act as separate proxies for investor protection.  
39
 // 7KXUVWRQH ³$ 0HWKRG RI 6FDOLQJ 3V\FKRORJLFDO DQG (GXFDWLRQDO 7HVWV´   Journal of Educational 
Psychology 433.  
40
 '7KLVVHQDQG/6WHLQEHUJ³,WHP5HVSRQVH7KHRU\´LQ5(0LOOVDSDQG$02OLYDUHVHGVThe Sage Handbook 
of Quantitative Methods in Psychology (2013).  
41
 BB Reeve and P Fayers, ³Applying item response theory modelling for evaluating questionnaire items and scale 
properties´, in P Fayers and R Hays (eds), Assessing Quality of Life in Clinical Trials: Methods of Practice, 2nd edn 
(2005).  
109 
 
difficulty parameter, ߚ௖ଵ௦௛ ?ଵ௩௢, of the observed variable. This can also be written as: the probability 
of whether Chile will have regulations that state that one share should equate to one vote.  
:HLJKLQJ WKLV DJDLQVW WKH ILQGLQJV LQ µ/DZ DQG )LQDQFH¶42, the data set includes forty-nine 
countries apart from Chile. In a similar vein, the equation to predict whether Argentina would have 
a regulation for c1sh_1vo would be:  
 ܲ൫ܿ ?ݏ݄ ? ?ݒ݋ǡ ܣݎ݃݁݊ݐ݅݊ܽ ൌ  ?ȁߠ஺௥௚௘௡௧௜௡௔ǡ ߙ௖ଵ௦௛ ?ଵ௩௢ ǡ ߚ௖ଵ௦௛ ?ଵ௩௢൯ ൌ   ? ? ൅  ݁ି ఈ೎భೞ೓ ?భೡ೚൫ఏିఉ೎భೞ೓ ?భೡ೚൯ 
 
For x countries, the following must be taken into account:  
 
x Yi denotes the observed response pattern of corporate governance indicators  
x j describes the individual corporate governance items  
x Įj represents the discrimination for j 
x ȕj signifies the difficulty for j 
 
$QGWUDLWși can be estimated as: 
  ?ሺ ௜ܻȁߠ௜ ǡ ߙ௜ ǡ ߚ௜ሻ ൌ ෑ ܲሺ ௜ܻ௝ ൌ  ?ȁߠ௜ ǡ ߙ௜ǡ ߚ௜ሻ௜௜ୀଵ 43 
 
The problem with executing IRT was simple: algebraically, it is impossible to solve an 
equation with one known value, pitted against three unknown values. Ultimately, this means that 
either: 1) difficulty and discrimination parameters should be known; or 2) their distribution pattern 
should be estimated;44 or 3) it should involve iterative simulations under Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) algorithms to converge to an approximate integration over the distribution.45 A 
                                                          
42
 R La Porta et al., ³Law and Finance´ (n 11). 
43
 F Baker and S Kim, Item Response Theory, 2nd edn (2004).  
44
 6HHJHQHUDOO\)0/RUG³0D[LPXP/LNHOLKRRGDQG%D\HVLDQ3DUDPHWHU(VWLPDWLRQLQ5HVSRQVH7KHRU\´
23 Journal of Educational Measurement 157.  
45
 See generally W Gilks, S Richardson and DJ Speigelhalter, Markov Chain Monte Carlo in practice (1997).  
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Bayesian estimation of IRT46 was also developed to complement the MCMC simulation; but this 
process was computer-intensive. Its full potential was only realised in the late 1990s, when 
processing power became more conventional.47 
The advantages of using IRT over CTT, where the model fully fits the data48 set, are 
PDQLIROG7REHJLQZLWK WKHUH LV LWHPSDUDPHWHU LQYDULDQFHZKLFKPHDQV WKDW µZKLOHDOO&77
concepts are specific to a given sample, the parameters of an IRT model hold for an entire 
SRSXODWLRQ¶49 This translates to item difficulty parameters being independent of subject ability, 
and subject abilities being independent of the items being observed. Secondly, CTT researchers 
are forced to do an arbitrary factor analysis on parameter value to realise the final index; but this 
never fully explains why certain factors are more important than others. It also fails to proffer an 
explanation as to why when using MCMC in IRT, in explaining the underlying trait, and assuming 
that each parameter has equal importance and discriminatory power, it is possible to simulate the 
probable values of parameters, and then extract the values that best fit the response pattern.  
 
C. LLSV DATA: COMPARISON OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
,QWKHµ/DZDQG)LQDQFH¶GDWDVHWWKHUHZHUHIRUW\-nine countries and eleven data indicators per 
country. Therefore there was a 49 x 11 data matrix. In this section, the corporate governance traits 
of forty-nine countries is estimated using a fully Bayesian algorithm.50 10,000 iterations each are 
run, across three chains of the algorithm. R is within parameter, and the trace plot indicates the 
chains have properly converged. The results are then traced in the caterpillar plot. The countries 
are staked in two columns, with ascending corporate governance traits. The line represents the 
ninety-five per cent credible interval for each estimated value of corporate governance. The filled-
up dot represents the mean, or true value, of the corporate governance trait for any given country. 
                                                          
46
 +6ZDPLQDWKDQ³3DUDPHWHUHVWLPDWLRQLQLWHPUHVSRQVHPRGHO´LQ5+DPEOHWRQHGApplication of Item Response 
Theory (1983).  
47
 6.LP³$QHYDOXDWLRQRID0DUNRYFKDLQ0RQWH&DUORPHWKRGIRUWKH5DVFKPRGHO´Applied Psychological 
Measurement 53DW]DQG%:-XQNHU³$VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGDSSURDFKWR0DUNRYFKDLQ0RQWH&DUORPHWKRGVIRU
LWHPUHVSRQVH WKHRU\PRGHOV´  Journal of Educational Behavioural Statistics '&OD\WRQ ³*HQHUDOL]HG
OLQHDUPL[HGPRGHOV´LQ WR Gilks, S Richardson and DJ Speigelhalter (eds), Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods 
in practice (1999).  
48
 R Hambleton, H Swaminathan and HJ Rogers, Fundamentals in Response Theory (1991).  
49
 $' 0HDG ³7HVW &RQVWUXFWLRQ XVLQJ &77 DQG ,57 ZLWK 8Q-representDWLYH VDPSOHV´ DYDLODEOH DW
http://mypages.iit.edu/mead/Mead_and_Meade-v10.pdf.  
50
 The statistical programme R was used to write the codes, in conjunction with JAGS, which is a programme used to 
analyse the Bayesian hierarchical models within the context of the MCMC simulation. 
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The empty circle represents the estimation of corporate governance traits using CTT. All data have 
been standardised51 for comparison.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The standardised score is also traced on the scatter plot, with the IRT-based scores on the 
Y-axis and the CTT-based scores on the X-axis. The dotted line is the regression line, whilst the 
solid line is the (0, 1) index line. 
                                                          
51
 The classical test scores were calculated by adding up the values from eleven corporate governance variables, and 
then the mean and standard deviations were calculated. The standard scores were calculated by using the following 
formula: (country score- mean score)/standard deviation. 
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Common law jurisdictions have been represented with a filled-up dot, and other jurisdictions are 
represented as hollow dots.  
Both the caterpillar plot and the scatter plot use the same corporate governance data set 
produced by LLSV, and compare the IRT estimates against the CTT values of the corporate 
governance index used by LLSV. From the plots it is clear that later criticisms of LLSV are true 
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concerning the prepositions put forward about common law jurisdictions.52 Most of the represented 
countries towards the top right corner of the diagram are over-estimated under CTT, and all of 
them are common law jurisdictions. At the same time, LLSV seems to have under-approximated 
corporate governance for most civil law countries. This shows that, even when data are 
inconsistent and biased, it is possible to get an accurate picture by using IRT instead of CTT.  
 
D. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF SELF-DEALING 
Djankov, La Porta, Silanes and Shleifer53 GHYLVHGDQRYHOLQGH[RQWKHµOHJDOSURWHFWLRQRIPLQRULW\
VKDUHKROGHUVDJDLQVWH[SORLWDWLRQE\FRUSRUDWH LQVLGHUV¶which they called the anti-self-dealing 
index. They coded for twenty-seven variables, which ranged from public and private enforcement 
of controls, to expropriation by management, across seventy-two countries. They also re-coded the 
LLSV ADRI from 1998, but improved this with more consistent coding. Nonetheless, in compiling 
the index, they still relied on factor analysis and CTT. The plots below explain how the index on 
ex ante private control would vary if IRT had been used in the first instance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52
 H Spamann, ³2Q WKH LQVLJQLILFDQFH DQGRU HQGRJHQHLW\ RI /D 3RUWD HW DO¶V $QWL-Director Rights Index under 
Consistent Coding´ (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=894301 and H Spamann, ³The Anti-Director Rights 
Index´ (2010) 23 Review of Financial Studies 467.  
53
 S Djankov, R La Porta, FL Silanes and A Shleifer, ³The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing´ (2005), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11883.pdf.  
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The caterpillar plot manifests an interesting result: there is wide dispersion of mean indices; 
but the country trend, approximately, remains the same. One methodological reason for the minor 
dispersion can be attributed to the breakup of factorial items into binomial variables, which was 
reflected in the 2005 findings.  
 
E. SPAMANN (2006) 
To correct the inherent flaws in the data collection that stemmed from LLSV (like the inconsistent 
coding and common law bias), Spamann focused on ADRI and coded for forty-six of the forty-
nine countries from the original experiment.54 Spamann used the original component variables of 
ADRI: 
 
x Whether proxy vote by mail is permitted 
x Whether shares can be blocked before a general meeting 
x Whether cumulative voting is allowed 
x Whether the oppressed minority shareholders are allowed an appropriate relief mechanism 
x Whether shareholders have pre-emptive rights to new issues 
x The percentage of share capital required to call an extraordinary general meeting 
 
He also added two more variables to investigate: 
 
x Whether one share affords one vote 
x Whether country laws stipulate for mandatory dividends 
 
Spamann concluded that the LLSV data contained errors, and therefore empirical studies 
based on that data were susceptible to erroneous results. Aside from this, Spamann also employed 
CTT to calculate his index. Here, the Spamann data are put through IRT, and are similarly 
scrutinised for dispersal problems like those found in LLSV. Critically, only ADRI values are 
addressed, and run through comparative IRT and CTT simulations. This is done for the six data 
                                                          
54
 Djankov, La Porta, Silanes and Shleifer (n 53).  
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items coded by Spamann in a cumulative index, followed by the Spamann coding of the work done 
by Djankov, La Porta, Silanes and Shleifer, plus the original data.  
 
 
 
 
The graphs show a correlation of .93 between the IRT and CTT estimations of ADRI in 
the LLSV data. There is a correlation of .88 for the re-coded ADRI vis-à-vis the Djankov, La Porta, 
Silanes and Shleifer data. And there is a correlation of .96 for the Spamann data, which is based 
on the definition used in the 2005 paper. This shows that consistent data shorten the gap between 
IRT and CTT estimation. But this correlation does not explain the whole story. If one looks at the 
plotting of the density graphs of traits derived under IRT and CTT, the picture is far clearer.  
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Instead of bunching the countries into neat categories, as done with CTT, IRT breaks down 
the categories, and provides a wider range of groupings. Thus, IRT creates more intuitive and 
realistic indices that provide accurate representations of the transition between corporate 
governance traits across different countries.  
 
F. CONCLUSION 
In closing, from the comparison, it is clear that corporate governance indexes utilising IRT enjoy 
advantage over those using CTT. Instead of having a rigid quantitative category, IRT affords a 
gradual range, which increases the inherent explanatory power of an index. This allows for the 
adjustment of rater reliability. Furthermore, IRT calculations do not execute arbitrary factor 
analysis, but instead use probabilistic modelling to estimate the parameter value for increased 
scientific robustness and indexing accuracy. This is not to say that IRT does not suffer from 
drawbacks. The learning curve is steep, and it is ever important to consistently monitor whether 
the models have converged before drawing conclusions. And it must be borne in mind that larger 
sample sizes have more explanatory power in providing credible intervals. It follows that, on 
balance, it is beneficial to utilise IRT to compute indices on corporate governance.  
 
